In this contribution, I will identify the main issues relevant for the applicability and application of international humanitarian law (IHL) in military operations under the command of the European Union (EU) and I will briefly describe the EU's practice and policy in this respect.
(ROE, requested by the Operation Commander and authorised by the Council, based on the EU's policy on the use of force 6 ). The OPLAN for military operations usually contains specific annexes dealing with legal issues and with the use of force. The EU's policy on the use of force explicitly requires respect for international law and political guidance based on military and legal advice. 7 The highest level of military command in EU military operations 8 rests with the Operation Commander. The Operation Commander will normally receive operational control over forces put at his disposal by the participating states via a transfer of authority. 9 Applicability and application of international humanitarian law 10 EU policy on the applicability of IHL Under Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 11 , the CSDP shall provide the Union with a military and civilian operational capacity for 'missions 12 This includes peace enforcement. 13 IHL applies to situations of armed conflict and occupation; thus, it also applies to peace operations when they amount to engagement in an armed conflict (or an occupation). 14 Consistent with the requirement that the EU respect international law in its external relations, 15 the EU and its member states accept that if EU-led forces become engaged in an armed conflict, IHL will fully apply to them. 16 However, this is likely to be the case in only a few EU operations. Indeed, EU military operations have included training missions, an anti-piracy operation, and several operations closer to peacekeeping than to peace enforcement. 17 EU policy is accordingly that IHL does not necessarily apply in all EU military operations, 18 nor is it necessarily considered the most appropriate standard as a matter of policy in all EU military operations (when not applicable as a matter of law).
In fact, EU-led forces have not so far become engaged in combat as a party to an armed conflict in any of the EU's military operations. While IHL could have become applicable if the situation had escalated in some of these operations, especially Artemis (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, this did not happen. 19 Nevertheless, the EU and its member states remain fully aware of the potential obligations of EU-led forces under IHL, in particular when the situation escalates.
When IHL does not apply, the EU primarily looks towards human rights law as the appropriate standard for the conduct of EU military operations (furthermore, human rights may be relevant when IHL does apply Observance of international humanitarian law by forces under the command of the European Union as both regimes may apply concurrently 20 ). I cannot elaborate on this here 21 except to say that the EU itself has extensive human rights obligations, especially under Article 6 of the TEU and its Charter of Fundamental Rights, 22 and is in the process of acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 23 Combined with all member states being parties to the ECHR, this limits legal interoperability challenges.
Nevertheless, the controversies regarding the applicability of human rights law to peace operations also arise for EU military operations, 24 notably the extraterritorial scope of application of human rights, the derogation from human rights on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, recourse to 'extraterritorial derogations', and the IHL-human rights relationship. 25 In any event, at least as a matter of policy, human rights provide significant guidance in EU military operations, and in practice, EU operational planning and ROE reflect human rights standards. Moreover, some of the legal acts relating to CSDP operations explicitly require respect for human rights. 26 An assessment must be made for each operation of whether IHL and/or human rights law are, or may become, applicable to the mission as a matter of law and/or should be applied as a matter of policy. In addition, it may be relevant to determine the obligations of the parties in theatre. 
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In some cases, this analysis is relatively simple: for instance, IHL does not apply to the EU's counter-piracy operation Atalanta. 27 In some cases, however, the assessment is more complex. For instance, in the case of a military mission in a theatre where an armed conflict is ongoing, a robust mandate may lead to the EU forces becoming engaged in combat and becoming a party to the conflict, even if this is not intended. This risk was present in EUFOR Tchad/RCA, for example. In such a case, the planning documents and the ROE should be flexible enough to address an escalation. There are various ways to achieve this flexibility, including defining the circumstances that will trigger more offensive/robust ROE combined with retaining such ROE at the level of the Operation Commander. Also, the Operation Commander may request additional or amended ROE.
Convergence of member states' IHL obligations and EU IHL commitments
States' different treaty obligations in the field of IHL can create problems of 'legal interoperability' in multinational operations. 28 However, the importance of such divergences is limited by the fact that a significant body of IHL rules has become part of customary international humanitarian law. 29 So far, IHL obligations in EU military operations seem to be primarily conceived as resting on the participating states. 32 However, the EU may also have its own IHL obligations, especially under customary IHL. 33 In fact, the question of who the parties are to a conflict involving multinational operations is currently being examined by the International Committee of the Red Cross Observance of international humanitarian law by forces under the command of the European Union (ICRC). 34 The EU has not developed a position on this, 35 but it has started to make political commitments in the field of IHL. In addition to its guidelines on promoting respect for IHL (by others), 36 it has made pledges at recent International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 37 and has signed up to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. 38 Issues of attribution, responsibility, and remedies are not addressed here. 39 It would seem, however, that as of now, very few issues of responsibility have actually arisen in practice. 40 
EU policy options and mechanisms to deal with divergences
Difficulties may arise when member states have different views on the qualification of a situation/mission and/or the applicable law. 41 Fortunately, a number of factors limit such disagreements or their impact.
First, policy choices may overcome different legal positions. For instance, Finland accepted that its forces would not use anti-personnel mines in EU military operations even though Finland had no obligation to this effect prior to 2012. Such a policy choice may minimise legal discussions. It may be made on an ad hoc basis for a given mission or in horizontal policy or conceptual documents.
Second, the combination of a common OPLAN and ROE (see above) with national caveats which member states may issue in relation to their forces also allows for interoperability while ensuring respect for each member state's obligations/positions. Caveats impose further restrictions on the use of force or tasks and permit a member state to ensure that its forces can respect any political or legal restrictions particular to it 42 without imposing these restrictions on the other member states. Therefore, while caveats complicate life, they are often the best solution in terms of respecting the different positions of member states.
The OPLAN should clarify as much as possible the applicable law and specify whether IHL and/or human rights law applies. However, this is not always the case, possibly in part to retain some flexibility when the situation may evolve. In this respect, references to 'applicable' rules of IHL or human rights law do not clarify whether, when or which of those rules actually are applicable and may require an Operation Commander to determine the applicable rules, with the assistance of legal advice at his/her level.
Final remarks
The EU attaches importance to respect for international law, including IHL, in its external relations. This is enshrined in its constitutive treaties and reflected in practice in its military operations.
The EU and its member states accept that if EU-led forces become a party to an armed conflict, IHL will fully apply to them. In that case, the EU is arguably bound by customary IHL, while its member states' forces also remain bound by their IHL treaty obligations. However, this has not been the case so far and will probably remain the exception. EU policy is that IHL does not necessarily apply in all EU military operations nor is it necessarily considered the most appropriate standard as a matter of policy in all EU military operations (when not applicable as a matter of law). Rather, in most operations the EU looks to human rights law as a more appropriate standard.
In EU military operations, the IHL (and human rights) obligations of the EU and those of its member states are largely similar. This limits legal interoperability issues. Where such issues nonetheless arise, the EU has a number of tools to deal with them, which so far have been adequate. 42 The OPLAN and ROE cannot require a member state's forces to act contrary to their national law.
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